Passengers are not required to see or understand preflight safety briefings

While passengers, especially those who fly frequently, often ignore the preflight safety briefing, they do serve a vital purpose, and over the last few decades these briefings have no doubt allowed passengers and crews to avoid serious injuries and deaths during emergencies. However, the experience of one passenger, who is also a career aviation safety professional, highlights the fact that airlines may not be required to ensure that passengers can hear or understand these safety briefings.

On 20 July 2013 I flew on a SAS MD82 from FCO (Rome) to CPH (Copenhagen), and I was in seat 33A. A panel was just in front of my seat and I could not see the safety demonstration carried out by the flight attendant standing many rows ahead (see photo below). In the same time, listening by the loudspeaker (in English and probably Danish) was difficult and irregular. No other safety information was given before takeoff.

The view from seat 33A on an SAS MD82

I don’t need to receive a safety demonstration as I have been working in the Italian Civil Aviation Authority for more than 30 years, but the handler and the airline did not know this when they assigned that seat to me. The aircraft was also full of Italians who probably weren’t able to fully understand the message without a visual demonstration. If the demonstration had been different from the usual I would not have been able to understand it at all.

Now I am pretty sure that everything has been done according to the rules, only I would like to know which rules. Is that seat certificated for all kind of passengers? For example many airlines require that emergency exit seats are available only for English speaking people (for example Air Canada). As I think that many MD82s are still in service in the USA, what is your opinion about this topic? - Valter

Dr. Todd Curtis of AirSafe.com responds
You raise an interesting set of questions. I'm not aware of the rules around the world for passenger safety briefings, but in the US, airlines that fly aircraft that are of size of the MD82 have very clear guidance on the visibility of flight attendants during the safety briefing. FAA Advisory Circular AC121-24C describes what is required to be, or should be, covered in oral passenger briefings. In the section that discusses passenger briefing requirements for operations that include flight attendants, it states the following:

The pretakeoff oral briefing should be given so that each passenger can clearly hear it and easily see required demonstrations.

By that standard, it appears that your flight, if it had been a US airline, would not have been in compliance with the requirements of this FAA Advisory Circular.

This advisory circular also requires that an airline provide passenger briefing information in the languages used by the airline. However, there are no requirements that every passenger should be given an oral safety briefing in a language that is understood by that passenger, and there are also no requirements that accommodations be made for passengers who may have limited sight or hearing.

When it comes to exit row seating, in the Advisory Circular the FAA strongly encourages, but does not mandate, that air carriers require crewmembers to provide a preflight personal briefing to each passenger seated in an exit seat. The FAA did not mention whether an exit row passenger should also understand English.

In summary, it appears that the FAA gives US airlines wide latitude when it comes to passengers safety briefings, and from your description of your SAS experience, only the fact that you were not able to see the flight attendant give the briefing would have fallen short of FAA requirements. On your particular flight, the relevant requirements would have been the appropriate European regulations that would have been in effect for SAS.

One of those regulations appears to be European Regulation (Reg CE 8/2008), which unlike the FAA regulation does not specifically require that the safety demonstration be visible to every passenger. Like the FAA Advisory Circular, this European regulation does not specify that the briefing be given in language that a passenger can understand.

Second NTSB update on Southwest 737 accident at LaGuardia

Earlier this week, the NTSB released a second update on the 22 July 2013 Southwest Airlines flight 345 landing accident at New York's LaGuardia Airport. The accident, which is being handled by the NTSB's Major Investigations Team, resulted in substantial damage to the aircraft.

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Initial press release
The initial NTSB press release on 23 July 2013 stated that the jet's nose landing gear collapsed rearward and upward into the fuselage, damaging the electronics bay. The aircraft was also damaged from sliding over 2,000 feet (610 meters) before coming to rest off to the right side of the runway.

First investigative update
Key findings from the first NTSB investigative update released on 25 July 2013 included the following:

• Evidence from video and other sources was consistent with the nose landing gear making contact with the runway before the main landing gear (this is the reverse of what happens in a normal landing).
• Flaps were set from 30 to 40 degrees about 56 seconds prior to touchdown.
• Altitude was about 32 feet, airspeed was about 134 knots, and pitch attitude was about 2 degrees nose-up approximately 4 seconds prior touchdown.
• At touchdown, the airspeed was approximately 133 knots and the aircraft was pitched down approximately 3 degrees.
• After touchdown, the aircraft came to a stop within approximately 19 seconds.

Second investigative update
Key findings from the second NTSB investigative update released on 6 August 2013 revealed additional information about the accident flight:

• This was the first trip the flight crew had flown together and it was the second leg of the trip.
• The first officer had previous operational experience at LGA, including six flights in 2013.
• The captain had one previous flight into LaGuardia.
• On approach into LaGuardia, the first officer was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring.
• The wind changed direction prior to landing, from an 11-knot tailwind when the aircraft was at 1,000 feet, to an 11-knot headwind at landing.
• The aircraft had been cleared for an ILS approach on runway 4 (see diagram below).
• The crew reported the airplane was on speed, course and glideslope down to about 200-400 feet.
• At some point above 400 feet, there was an exchange of control of the airplane and the captain became the flying pilot and made the landing.
• The NTSB has so far found no mechanical anomalies or aircraft malfunctions, and that a preliminary examination of the nose landing gear indicated that it failed due to stress overload.
• The NTSB has collected five videos showing various aspects of the crash landing. The team will be analyzing these recordings as part of the investigation.

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Photos: NTSB, Wikipedia

Surprising exceptions to hazardous materials restrictions

While the TSA has a number of restrictions on hazardous and dangerous items, the FAA allows passengers to travel with several categories of hazardous items on commercial airliners. These exceptions are for small amounts of hazardous materials, typically included in items that are for personal use.

The FAA has provided a rather detailed table listing these exceptions, and they explain in that document that the TSA may on occasion prohibit these items, and that airlines may have additional limitations on these items. Some of the hazardous materials exceptions mentioned in the FAA document are listed below:

• Toilet or medicinal articles that are hazardous materials such as rubbing alcohol, flammable perfume and colognes, nail polish and remover, and aerosols (hairspray, shaving cream, etc.).
• One book of safety matches (book matches) allowed in carry-on bags only.
• One lighter (gas or absorbed liquid) in carry-on baggage only.
• Up to 5 liters of alcoholic beverages with an alcohol content of more than 24% but not more than 70% in unopened retail package, in carry-on or checked bags depending on the situation (Note: for tips on how to travel with liquor, which is typically a duty-free item, visit AirSafe.com for advice.
• A cordless curling iron with a flammable gas cartridge installed.
• Small personal mercury thermometer in a protective case.
• Small arms ammunition (up to 19.1 mm for rifle and pistol cartridges, any size bshotgun shells) for personal use, when securely boxed (checked baggage only). Also, check out this 2010 AirSafeNews.com article on how to travel with firearms.
• One small (4-ounce or less) self-defense spray (checked baggage only).
• Diving lamps and other battery-operated extreme heat producing equipment, with power disconnected and in carry-on bags only.
• Small lithium and lithium-ion batteries in consumer electronic devices. Spare batteries must be protected from damage and short circuit and placed in carryon baggage.

For questions or comments regarding these hazardous materials regulations, please contact the Hazardous Materials Information Center at: 800.467.4922 or infocntr@dot.gov

For questions about TSA prohibited items or other air travel security measures please visit tsa.airsafe.com, which has a detailed overview of what is allowed in either carry-on or checked baggage, what is completely prohibited, and what kinds of exceptions are allowed by the TSA.

For details on typical airport security procedures please visit security.airsafe.com. You can also visit the TSA web site at www.tsa.gov, or contact the TSA for questions about security procedures or prohibited items at 1.866.289.9673 or tsa-contactcenter@dhs.gov.

FAA further restricts non-US airlines using the San Francisco airport

On 30 July 2013, the FAA issued additional restrictions for non-US airlines landing at the San Francisco International airport (SFO). In addition to the earlier restriction that non-US airline crews use their GPS systems to help guide them during landings operated under visual flight conditions, this new restriction does not allow non-US crews to land alongside another plane during visual flight conditions. Domestic carriers are still allowed to perform side-by-side landings.

Typical restrictions on parallel runways
Under visual flight rules (VFR) conditions, the FAA allows simultaneous aircraft arrivals and departures so long as the parallel runways meet minimum spacing requirements. Runways 28L and 28R, the longest two runways at SFO, meet these minimum requirements. Runway 28L is the one being used by Asiana flight 214 when it crashed on 6 July 2013.

Why is the FAA singling out non-US carriers at SFO?
One the reasons given by the FAA for its latest restriction was so that it would "minimize distractions during a critical phase of flight." Given the recent crash at SFO, and the fact that this restriction, as well as the earlier recommended use of a GPS device during visual approaches to SFO, is only aimed at non-US airlines, the actions of the FAA imply that the organization believes that all non-US airlines are at higher risk when landing under VFR conditions at SFO.

These decisions of the FAA would make sense, and would be justified, if the FAA could show a measurable difference between how well crews of US airlines land at SFO compared to crews of non-US airlines. Perhaps one of easiest to understand comparison would be the rate of missed approaches by the two groups of airlines. While the FAA has mentioned that there have been a number of missed approaches by non-US airlines at SFO since the Asiana crash, the FAA has not released detailed and comprehensive data that would allow a fair comparison between these two groups of airlines.

Opinion: What may be behind the recent rule changes
The early factual information that has come from the NTSB investigation of the Asiana crash indicates that the Asiana crew was unable to execute a stabilized approach to one of the longest runways in the US under daylight VFR conditions. Instituting these rule changes for all non-US airlines in the absence of any kind of NTSB recommendation for changing landing procedures at SFO makes sense if following things happen to be true:

• That there are only a subset of the airlines that have issues with visual approaches.
• The FAA was aware of this potential problem with specific airlines before the NTSB began its investigation of the Asiana crash.
• The FAA does not wish to publicly embarrass a particular airline or the civil aviation organization of that airline's home country by suggesting that it is allowing pilots to fly airliners without having those pilots demonstrate mastery of basic VFR piloting skills.

What's the FAA's next move?
The last two announcements by the FAA were not expected. After an accident, it is unusual to have procedural changes implemented that focus on a group of airlines. If changes are made to procedures associated with a particular airport, then all aircraft using that airport would be subject to those changes. This combination of changes affecting only particular airlines at one airport is not only unusual, but the logic behind it has at least one obvious flaw.

When the FAA issued its earlier recommendations to use a GPS during SFO approaches, an FAA representative stated that the recommendation was a response to concerns that some non-US airline pilots may not have sufficient experience or expertise to land an airliner using visual approach procedures, which don't rely primarily on electronic landing aids.

While this explanation may make sense for non-US airlines that are flying to SFO from Europe or Asia, but it would not make sense for airlines from Canada and Mexico. Also, by implementing these rule changes for all non-US airlines, the FAA is implying that airlines like British Airways and Qantas, airlines that are noted within the airline industry for the capability of their crews and quality of their training and operating procedures, and which have been flying to SFO for decades, have suddenly become operators of aircraft flown by higher risk flight crews.

Additional information

• AirSafeNews.com 30 July 2013: FAA suggests non-US airline crews lack basic piloting skills
• AirSafeNews.com 15 July 2013: Questions about the crash of Asiana flight 214
• AirSafeNews.com 13 July 2013 article summarizing the two prior NTSB press conferences
• AirSafeNews.com 10 July 2013 article on the role of the autothrottle
• AirSafeNews.com 8 July 2013 article on early findings of the crash investigation
• Other Asiana plane crashes
• Other 777 plane crashes
• Accident details from Aviation Safety Network
• Wikipedia page on this accident

FAA suggests non-US airline crews lack basic piloting skills

On Sunday 28 July 2013, the FAA issued a recommendation that non-US airlines landing at San Francisco International airport (SFO) use their GPS systems to help guide them during landings operated under visual flight conditions at the airport's longest runways, including runway 28L, which was the one being used by the Asiana 777 that crashed at SFO on 6 July 2013 . This implies that non-US pilots may not have the basic piloting skills needed to consistently land aircraft at SFO under visual flight rules.

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Dr. Todd Curtis on new FAA recommendations

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An FAA representative stated that the recommendation was a response to concerns that some non-US airline pilots may not have sufficient experience or expertise to land an airliner using visual approach procedures, which don't rely primarily on electronic landing aids.

Neither the FAA or the NTSB has stated that the visual approach procedures were a factor in the crash of Asiana flight 214 on July 6th. However, since that crash, the FAA has revealed that an unspecified number of flights involving Asiana, EVA Air, and other non-US carriers have had more aborted landing attempts than usual at SFO.

Since last week, the FAA has instituted a different landing protocol for visual approaches on runway 28L, the intended landing runway for Asiana flight 214, and the parallel runway 28R. That protocol will have air traffic controllers at SFO requesting that non-US airliners use a GPS-based navigation system to assist those flight crews in landing on either of those runways.

In a visual approach, pilots typically don't rely on a variety of electronic aids like an instrument landing system to align the aircraft with the runway and to keep to the aircraft on the proper glide slope. On runway 28L, the glide slope system was not operable on the day of the accident, and is scheduled to be out of commission until 22 August 2013. During a visual approach, pilots may use the glide slope system, as well as other systems like the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) system, which was used by the crew on Asiana fight 214.

While the FAA did not state when the recommendation for non-US airlines would be lifted, it would likely not be necessary once the glide slope system is back in operation.

Additional information

• AirSafeNews.com 15 July 2013: Questions about the crash of Asiana flight 214
• AirSafeNews.com 13 July 2013 article summarizing the two prior NTSB press conferences
• AirSafeNews.com 10 July 2013 article on the role of the autothrottle
• AirSafeNews.com 8 July 2013 article on early findings of the crash investigation
• Other Asiana plane crashes
• Other 777 plane crashes
• Accident details from Aviation Safety Network
• Wikipedia page on this accident

Disturbing implications of the recent 787 fire in London

The recent 787 fire at Heathrow Airport in London appeared at first to be a relatively minor event with a limited impact beyond the aircraft involved. However, when the investigative authority, the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) of the UK, released its preliminary report on the event, the recommendations that were made implied that the problem had the potential to be far more serious had it occurred in flight.

Key findings of the AAIB report
The initial AAIB report, stated that the fire damage coincided with the location of the emergency locator transmitter (ELT), and although the AAIB did not state that the ELT was the source of the fire, the aircraft was unpowered at the time of the fire, and no other aircraft systems in the area contained an energy source capable of starting a fire. The ELT is designed to operate without any power from the aircraft's electrical system, and is powered by a set of chemical batteries using a Lithium-Manganese Dioxide (LiMnO2) composition. This kind of battery represents a different technology from the lithium-ion batteries associated with the fires on two different 787 aircraft in January 2013.

What the fire fighters encountered in London
According to the AAIB, when fire fighters entered the aircraft through the front left door (the 787 has four pairs of doors), they encountered thick smoke and had to open at least two other cabin doors to clear the smoke. They were unable to extinguish the fire with a handheld Halon fire extinguisher, and had to forcibly remove a ceiling panel and use water from a fire hose to put out the fire. While this was apparently not an complicated procedure for the fire crews on the ground, it could have been an entirely different situation had this occurred in the air.

Visible external damage to 787 in London

Why a fire in flight would have been much more dangerous
The AAIB investigation is ongoing, and the organization has not identified the ELT as the source of the fire. However, if the ELT turns out to be the source of this particular fire, it raises the very disturbing possibility that this kind of fire could have occurred not just on the ground in an empty aircraft, but also while the aircraft was in the air. This could potentially be a far more serious event in the air for the following reasons:

• Unlike on the ground, opening one or more doors to evacuate smoke is not an option in flight,
• While there are handheld fire extinguishers in the cabin that flight attendants can use in an emergency, equipment or other tools suitable for removing ceiling panels are not typically available to cabin crew.
• While the fire fighters in the London incident had access to water hoses to put out the fire, no such option would be available to an airborne 787.
• in the event of an onboard fire, typical emergency procedures include landing at the closest suitable airport, but since the 787 often flies on routes that are an hour or more from a suitable airport, passengers and crew could be exposed to large amounts of smoke and fumes for a significant amount of time.
• Emergency oxygen systems may not have been useful for passengers since these systems are typically designed to supply supplemental oxygen, in other words, passenger would be breathing a combination of oxygen from the emergency oxygen system and ambient air from the cabin, including any smoke or fumes that are present in the cabin.

A nightmare scenario
Simply put, the aforementioned conditions imply that had this event occurred in the middle of a flight, the cabin crew may have been unable to reach the source of the fire, and even if they did, they may not have been able to put the fire out. The aircraft involved in the fire at London's Heathrow airport sustained damage to the composite structure of that airplane's fuselage. Conceivably, if the fire had been allowed to burn for a significant amount of time, a situation that could have occurred had the airplane been inflight, the fire could have led to significant damage to the aircraft's systems, or could have caused the aircraft to lose its structural integrity. Either outcome could have led to the loss of the aircraft and all on board.

An additional twist to this story
While the previous scenario may be disturbing to the average passenger, what may cause additional concerns, especially to aircraft manufacturers and airline operators, is the possible role of the ELT in the fire in London. This is a system that is noteworthy for not being a source problems that could lead to the loss of an airliner. In fact, according to the AAIB, the manufacturer of the ELT involved in the London fire, Honeywell, has produced some 6,000 ELT units of the design used in the Ethiopian 787 involved in the London fire event, and that event is the first incident where the ELT system generated a significant level of heat.

Actions taken to deal with the threat
Following the recommendations of the AAIB, the FAA and other regulatory agencies around the world have ordered that 787 ELTs be deactivated, inspected, or removed. Until the AAIB, Boeing, and Honeywell figure out the role played by the ELT in the London fire, questions will remain as to whether the 787 ELT represents an unexpected and potentially fatal risk to 787 passengers.

Key safety and technology trends affecting airline passengers

The last few weeks has seen the world media pay a tremendous amount of attention airline safety issues, especially in the wake of the fatal crash landing of Asiana flight 214 in San Francisco on 6 July 2013 and the landing incident on 22 July 2013 involving a Southwest Airlines 737 in New York. These two events have actually highlighted several of the key safety trends in aviation that will likely affect passengers not only in the US, but around the world.

How the crash of an Asiana 777 demonstrated improvements in aircraft
This accident represented not only the first fatal accident involving the 777, but the first fatal accident involving a large jet airliner in the US in almost 12 years. Perhaps more significant was that an accident that resulted in significant damage to the aircraft and a post-crash fire resulted in only three fatalities.

777 accident in San Francisco

While luck plays a part in any fatal accident with survivors, perhaps a more significant role was played by improvements in aircraft design and crew procedures that have occurred over the last few decades, including the following:

• Aircraft designs that minimize the risk of rupturing fuel tanks when landing gear are sheared away,
• Cabin materials that are designed to be both more fire resistant and less prone to give off dangerous fumes if they do catch fire,
• Passenger seats that are designed to withstand greater crash forces,
• Crew training that emphasizes coordination of cabin crew and flight crew actions during emergencies, and
• Stricter requirements for passenger evacuation to allow the evacuation of a full aircraft in 90 seconds or less, even if half of the exits are not useable.

How safe is flying?
Since the beginning of large scale airline operations, and especially in the last 30 years, the risks of flying, specifically the risk of a fatal event that kills passengers, has steadily decreased, and the likelihood of survival increasing, in part through innovations in technology and procedures. These improvements are happening because of deliberate efforts by the aviation community and the governments that regulate aviation to identify risks and find ways to eliminate them, make them less likely to occur, or lessen the effects of unwanted outcomes like plane crashes.

Working on the important risks
Aircraft manufacturers, international aviation organizations, and government regulators regularly share information on where the major problems are and what steps have to be taken to address them. The two recent accidents in the US, both of which are being investigated by the NTSB, will be part of this sharing process. They were both landing related accidents, which happens to be a area of high interest among airline manufacturers, airlines, and regulatory authorities.

The findings of the investigation, as well as any recommended changes to technology or procedures, will be provided not only to the organizations involved in the accidents, but to the general public, and will likely contribute to future changes to airline industry, changes that will make these kinds of accidents less likely.

How technology puts power in the hands of the people
The recent accidents in San Francisco and New York were also examples of how technology in the hands of passengers and the public has radically changed the relationship the public has with the airlines. In both cases, news of the accidents, including photos and videos, went out not only through traditional news media, but also through Twitter, YouTube, Vine, and other social media applications. In the case of the crash in San Francisco, the NTSB used Twitter and YouTube to put photos, press conferences, and other information from the investigation online, allowing any interested person to get the information direct from the source, without waiting for traditional media to filter the content.

737 landing accident at LaGuardia

Other key technology trends
The growth in the availability of affordable and portable online access continues to be a reality in virtually all areas of the globe. While it is impossible to say where that technology is going, it is clear that there are several areas where this technology has made a huge difference to airline passengers compared to ten or even five years ago:

• Allow for easy ticket price comparisons and ticket purchases online,
• Provide personalized in-flight entertainment,
• Provide passengers with the means to document accidents, incidents, and poor airline customer service, and to share it with the world, and
• Allow passengers to access a full range of information about an airline 24 hours a day.

Perhaps the greatest change for passengers is that the existence of the Internet makes the entire aviation system much more transparent to everyone. When accidents occur, the news flashes around the world in seconds. It has become very difficult for an airline, aircraft manufacturer, or government agency to hide the truth about their activities from the public, either because someone publishes a photo or other information that reveals the truth, or because information such as accident and incident data that used to be very difficult for the public to find is now much easier to find.

This last point may not be important to airline passengers who live in countries with a free and open press where critical reporting on the activities of governments and corporations in the norm. In many parts of the world, especially countries where there has been a rapid increase in the standard of living and much greater access to air travel services, having the ability to find information from sources that are not controlled by their government, especially information about airlines that are often partly or completely controlled by their government, would be next to impossible without access to the Internet.