New Security Measures in Effect for International Flights

As of January 4th, the US government started new security requirements for international flights with a US destination. While some of the measures are temporary, others may be more permanent.

Travelers Subject to Enhanced Screening
The TSA is requiring that everyone flying into the US who is either traveling from or traveling through nations considered to be are state sponsors of terrorism or other countries of interest will be required to go through enhanced screening. At present, those countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.

This may not represent much of a change. In the security procedures manual that was accidentally released to the public by the TSA last year, on page 81 it listed 12 countries whose citizens were subject to additional screening. Of the 14 listed above, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were not listed in the earlier procedures manual, and North Korea, which was listed in the procedures manual, was not listed in last week's announcement.

Changes in Prohibited Items
Security requirements for passengers departing US airports remain the same, but additional security measures may be used. TSA will continue to permit prescription liquid medications and other liquids needed by persons with disabilities and medical conditions.

The TSA has stated that passengers wearing loose fitting or bulky clothing, including headwear, may be subject to additional screening. If a passengers chooses not to remove bulky clothing or headwear, they may be subject to a pat down search.

When to Arrive at the Airport
The TSA advises passengers on international flights bound to the US allow additional time to get through security, and to check in with their airport or airline for more specific advice.

Other Security Changes
While some changes were required by TSA, individual airlines may have additional rules or restrictions. Some of the ones reported in the last week include turning off electronic equipment remaining seated during an extended period before landing, keeping laps clear of items such as blankets for large portions of the flight, and additional restrictions on when the lavatories can be used. TSA does not manage security for airports outside of US territory, so each country may have additional restrictions and requirements.

Canadian Airports Put on High Alert
Last Saturday, Canadian airports were put on heightened alert after Transport Canada received credible evidence of a new terrorist threat. A member of the AirSafeNews.com audience who traveled from Canada to the US in the last couple of days said that in addition to a pat down search and a search of carry on bags, laptop bags with wheels were not allowed on board. While it may have been to prevent travelers from claiming that a bag was a laptop bag and not a carry on, the rule has also been enforced for true laptop cases that happen to have wheels. This new rule forced the person who submitted this report to exit the secure area, spend $140 for a new laptop case, and clear customs a second time.

Additional Resources
Permitted and Prohibited Items

The Bombing Attmept on Northwest Flight 253 and TSA's Accidental Release Secret and Sensitive Security Information

After the unsuccessful bombing attempt last week on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, not much is known for sure, including how the suspect was able to overcome all the various layers of security. One possibility was that the information accidentally released earlier this year by TSA may have helped the suspect.

The TSA manual was reviewed by Dr. Curtis of AirSafe.com, and there did not appear to be any obvious or even indirect connection between the actions of the suspected bomber and the information in the manual.

The video and audio podcast below provides an overview of the information that was in the manual, and the links at the bottom of the article go to previous AirSafeNews.com articles on the TSA manual, as well as to the edited and unedited versions of the TSA manual. AirSafeNews.com encourages its readers to review the information, and to contact AirSafeNews.com if they have any insights or opinions on either the TSA manual release, or the recent bombing attempt.

Video and Audio Podcast Links (2:23)
Audio: MP3 | Video: iPod/MP4 | WMV | YouTube

Related Information
Full TSA report
Redacted TSA report
TSA prohibited and restricted Items

Related AirSafeNews.com Articles
AirSafeNews.com article on the attempted bombing
Description of four key US terrorist and TSA security databases
BBC interview with AirSafeNews.com's Dr. Todd Curtis

TSA Releases Extremely Sensitive Security Information Online

The latest TSA controversy involves an inadvertent release of a document containing very sensitive security information that resulted in making key security procedures available to the public. The document, “Screening Procedures: Standard Operating Procedures,” provided standard procedures for TSA screening personnel in airports. It was the third revision, and was dated 28 May 2008. The document contained a range of information, including some sensitive security information that was redacted by the TSA.

The TSA posted it on the web site FedBizOpps.gov in March 2009, and it was removed from the site this past Sunday after the TSA realized, with the help of a number of blogs including Wanderingaramean.com, that the blacked out portion did not hide the information. You can download the redacted version and see for yourself.

It appears that the part of the TSA responsible for releasing the document to the FedBizOpps.gov site had a fundamental misunderstanding of how electronic documents work. It's likely that when the TSA 'redacted' areas of sensitive information in the original word processing document, black rectangles were placed over those areas, covering the information, but not deleting it. By selecting the blackened areas in the PDF document, copying it, and pasting it into a word processing file in a program like MS Word, Notepad, or OpenOffice Writer, anyone can recover the information that was within those blackened areas.

By the time the TSA had the document removed from the FedBizOpps.gov web site, it was too late. Copies of the redacted and unredacted information were now widely available online, and the information that was once hidden from the pubic is now out in the open.

Potential Security Impacts
The aviation security manual included details on TSA procedures for screening passengers, special rules for handling the diplomats, law enforcement officials, and CIA employees, and the technical settings and tolerances used by metal and explosive detectors used at airports.

Some of the more sensitive details in the TSA document were not widely known prior to the release of this document. Clearly, anyone attempting to do harm to the US air transportation system may use this information to attempt to fraudulently gain access to airliners or to secure areas of an airport terminal, or to take prohibited items through TSA security. This breach of security may force the TSA to change one or more procedures, and may make current security procedures and technology either less effective, or completely ineffective against some threats.

Because details about aviation security procedural or policy changes are typically not released to the public or subject to Freedom of Information Act requests, it is unlikely that the public will be made aware of any TSA changes, unless of course such information is accidentally released.

Highlights of Redacted Information
The redacted sections of the document contained a range of information, some of it mundane, and others frightening. The highlights, with page numbers from the 93-page document, are below:

• There exists an explosives trace detection screening protocol in which a percentage of checked baggage is screened using closed bag search (40%), limited open bag search (40%), and full open bag search (20%) procedures (page 9).
  
  
• Transportation Security Officers should not handle explosives, incendiaries, or weapons if such items are discovered during the screening process (page 20).
  
  
• There are specific procedures to follow to check the credentials of law enforcement officers and other armed government employees (page 21).
  
  
• Calibration testing procedures for walk-through metal detectors (page 27).
  
  
• Daily testing procedures for walk-through metal detectors (page 28).
  
  
• Operational test procedure for x-ray systems (page 29).
  
  
• Contamination control procedures for explosives trace detection devices (page 30).
  
  
• Procedures for clearing armed security officers into the secure area of the terminal (pages 28-40).
  
  
• Procedures for the screening of foreign dignitaries being escorted by the Central Intelligence Agency (page 43-44).
  
  
• Screening exemptions for TSA employees (page 45).
  
  
• Categories of passengers who are to be exempted from closer scrutiny after initially being selected for extra screening (page 47).
  
  
• Alternate screening procedures go into effect when primary screening devices are not working (page 52).
  
  
• Matrix of special screening procedures for law enforcement officers ( pages 54-55).
  
  
• Photos and graphics of with sample credentials for Federal Air Marshals, ATF employees, CIA employees, and members of the US Congress (pages 57-60).
  
  
• Procedures to use if explosives trace detection devices or x-ray devices are are unavailable or have limited function (page 77).
  
  
• Explosives trace detection exemptions for persons with disabilities (page 78).
  
  
• Allowing explosives trace detection procedures for bags and containers while using physical searches for all other items (page 78).
  
  
• Unless exempted by the airline or the TSA security director, passengers with passports issued by the following countries are to be selected for extra screening: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, and Algeria (page 81).
  
  
• Characteristics of suspect identification (page 82).
  
  
• Alternative methods for checking travel documents (page 83).

Lessons Learned
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned here is that electronic documents are not like printed documents. Depending on the document, what you see is not necessarily what you get. The version that you see may have coded within the document data about previous edits, formatting information, and hidden characters. There may also be several layers of information, such as the case with the TSA document where the blacked out portion did not eliminate the sensitive information, but merely covered it up.

A more effective method for redacting a document would have been to delete the sensitive information from the original document before turning it into a PDF file. Perhaps this TSA security controversy will be a lesson to anyone who works with electronic documents that they should be careful when 'redacting' documents.

Resources
Full TSA Report
Redacted TSA Report
TSA Prohibited and Restricted Items

Follow Up Articles
How the TSA Could Have Easily Avoided Its Recent Security Problem
Continued Fallout from TSA Release of Sensitive Security Information

Survey and Comments
Given the security implications of this TSA release of information, AirSafeNews.com would be particularly interested in any comments that you may have. Please take the time to fill out the survey below:

The survey is now closed. The results of the survey are available here.

Update: Loose Screws on a Jat Airways 737

Late last week, AirSafe.com News relayed a story from the Blic newspaper of Serbia about Jat Airways Flight JU 5245, which flew from Greece to Serbia on 14 August 2009 with several visibly loose and missing screws in the area of the left engine.

Shortly after Blic published several stories about the loose screws, including detailed photographs, Jat Airways addressed the issue and did their best to address the public's concerns. The airline performed a special inspection of their fleet and reported that the problems were corrected.

It may be difficult to know all the details of the aircraft that got the most attention, a 737-300 with tail number YU-AON. According to Blic, the airline stated that the aircraft was last inspected on August 5th, and that the airline discovered the problem with the screws as a result of Blic's newspaper reports. Another passenger reported to the newspaper that another Jat Airways 737 flight, possibly involving the same aircraft, had a similar problem almost two weeks earlier on August 1st, and other passengers reported similar problems with other Jat Airways aircraft. The newspaper did not publish these other photos, but it did share with AirSafe.com News a picture of the repaired area of aircraft YU-AON. The previous AirSafe.com News article has several photos of the problem screws.

This incident, although it involved a rather small airline in Serbia, resulted in more comments than any other story previously posted by the AirSafe.com News. The general sentiment was that these loose and missing screws was not only an unsafe condition, but it may indicate that the airline may have other, more serious problems, both seen and unseen.

The two most important programs that evaluate the safety of airlines and national civil aviation authorities have different findings on the safety of Serbian civil aviation. The most recent European Commission list of airlines not allowed to fly in EU countries (dated 14 July 2009) does not include Jat Airways or any other airline from Serbia, but the FAA's International Aviation Safety Assessments (IASA) Program does not evaluate airlines, but rather the ability of a national civil aviation authority to provide safety oversight of airline operators in accordance with the minimum safety oversight standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In the FAA's most recent report from 18 December 2008, Serbia did not comply with ICAO standards, and as a result, Jat Airways would not be allowed to fly its aircraft to or from the US.

Given these mixed reviews, the average passenger may think twice before flying on this airline. AirSafe.com would be very interested in what you think about this situation, so please feel free to leave your comments about this article.

If you see loose screws on your jet, should you worry?

What would you do if you were flying on a plane, looked outside your window, and saw a bunch of missing or loose screws? If you were a passenger with a convenient window seat on Jat Airways Flight JU 5245 on 14 August 2009, you would have done the right thing by bringing it to the attention of the airline and the news media.

According to a report in the Serbian newspaper Blic, this particular aircraft, a 737, was on a flight from the Greek islands to Belgrade, and the flight took off in spite of having a panel on the left engine strut with at least five loose screws and one screw that was completely missing.

One of the editors from the Blic newspaper provided AirSafe.com with a number of photos, one of which clearly shows the missing and loose screws in the foreground, and the Greek city of Heraklion, on the island of Crete, in the background. The aircraft, which arrived safety in Belgrade after its charter flight from Greece, was apparently a 737-300 aircraft with the tail number JU-AON. According to Planespotters.net, the aircraft is almost 22 years old, and was previously operated by at least two other airlines, Transbrasil and Region Air.

According to Blic, Jat airways told both the passengers and the newspapers that it was a small problem that would not have affected the safety of that aircraft. No one at AirSafe.com has specific experience or expertise when it comes to general 737 aircraft maintenance procedures, or the particular maintenance procedures and flight operations rules at Jat Airwarys. However, it would be safe to assume that for most passengers, allowing an airliner to fly with loose and missing screws are an obvious cause for concern. Most passengers would hope that if the maintenance crew or flight crew were aware of such a condition, that the condition should either be corrected, or the proper procedures be followed to address the issue before allowing the aircraft to fly.


Given the location of the loose and missing screws, it is possible that if the the panel or other structure associated with the screws came loose in flight, that it could fly off and strike other parts of the aircraft. Also, a failure in one part of the aircraft skin or structure, for example a panel peeling off in flight, could cause damage to adjacent areas of the aircraft.

After being contacted by the Blic newspaper, AirSafe.com suggested that the newspaper should attempt to contact Jat Airways and to ask and answer the following questions:

- Were the flight crews or maintenance crews aware of the loose and missing screws before the flight?

- Did the maintenance and flight crew follow Jat Airways procedures with respect to the missing and loose screws?

- Are the airline's procedures consistent with Boeing's recommended procedures for the 737-300?

- Are the airline's procedures consistent with the regulations and laws of the Serbian civil aviation authorities?

- How many flights did this aircraft make before the condition was corrected?

- Are missing screws a common occurrence with aircraft in the Jat Airways fleet?

While Blic investigates this incident, the AirSafe.com News would like to ask its readers for feedback, especially from pilots, maintenance technicians, and airline safety professionals, about this particular issue. Feel free to leave comments on this blog posting, or to contact AirSafe.com directly.

Two Veteran Airline Captains Discuss the Crash of a Spanair MD82

The previous podcast reviewed the initial findings from the Spanish accident investigation. The video version of the podcast also included portions of a security camera video that captured the final moments of the flight. This podcast features a discussion that was originally recorded on August 23rd, 2008, three days after the crash of the Spanair MD82, and featured Capt. Tom Bunn of the SOAR fear of flying organization, and Capt. Steve Fisher, a veteran airline pilot who has flown for a major US airline for over two decades.

Capt. Bunn has been a guest previously on the show, and in this episode he'll talk about some of the anxieties and concerns that have been expressed to him by some passengers.

In the days following the Spanair crash, I brought Capt. Bunn and Capt. Fisher together to provide insights into the mechanics of flying a large jet transport, especially the MD82, and to give the audience an idea of the kind of training and preparation pilots go through to prepare for emergencies during takeoff.

Early on in our conversation, the two captains discussed some of the issues that came up during the the first few days of the investigation, including a problem with a temperature sensor that caused the crew of the accident aircraft to return to the terminal after its first takeoff attempt.

You can use the following link for the podcast: Audio: MP3

Additional information about the Spanair accident, including links to a video showing the crash, and links to further updates from the investigation, will be available at http://spanair.airsafe.org.

For other AirSafe.com podcasts, visit http://podcast.airsafe.org