Dr. Curtis and host of the Calgary Today show Whitney Dean of CHQR radio in Calgary, Canada discuss a number of issues related to the Christmas day bombing attempt on Northwest flight 253, including Nigerian airline security, a review of US terrorists databases, and the technologies and procedures that are currently used to prevent airliner bombing attempts. The following interview took place on 29 December 2009.
Listen to the interview (16:10)
29 December 2009
WGN Radio Interview About Attempted Bombing of Northwest Flight 253
As information about the unsuccessful bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 continues to be uncovered, some are questioning the usefulness of some of the security measures being implemented, and whether profiling may be needed to deter attacks. The following interview was with WGN radio in Chicago on 29 December 2009
Listen to the interview (14:39)
Listen to the interview (14:39)
The Bombing Attmept on Northwest Flight 253 and TSA's Accidental Release Secret and Sensitive Security Information
After the unsuccessful bombing attempt last week on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, not much is known for sure, including how the suspect was able to overcome all the various layers of security. One possibility was that the information accidentally released earlier this year by TSA may have helped the suspect.
The TSA manual was reviewed by Dr. Curtis of AirSafe.com, and there did not appear to be any obvious or even indirect connection between the actions of the suspected bomber and the information in the manual.
The video and audio podcast below provides an overview of the information that was in the manual, and the links at the bottom of the article go to previous AirSafeNews.com articles on the TSA manual, as well as to the edited and unedited versions of the TSA manual. AirSafeNews.com encourages its readers to review the information, and to contact AirSafeNews.com if they have any insights or opinions on either the TSA manual release, or the recent bombing attempt.
Related Information
Full TSA report
Redacted TSA report
TSA prohibited and restricted Items
Related AirSafeNews.com Articles
AirSafeNews.com article on the attempted bombing
Description of four key US terrorist and TSA security databases
BBC interview with AirSafeNews.com's Dr. Todd Curtis
The TSA manual was reviewed by Dr. Curtis of AirSafe.com, and there did not appear to be any obvious or even indirect connection between the actions of the suspected bomber and the information in the manual.
The video and audio podcast below provides an overview of the information that was in the manual, and the links at the bottom of the article go to previous AirSafeNews.com articles on the TSA manual, as well as to the edited and unedited versions of the TSA manual. AirSafeNews.com encourages its readers to review the information, and to contact AirSafeNews.com if they have any insights or opinions on either the TSA manual release, or the recent bombing attempt.
Related Information
Full TSA report
Redacted TSA report
TSA prohibited and restricted Items
Related AirSafeNews.com Articles
AirSafeNews.com article on the attempted bombing
Description of four key US terrorist and TSA security databases
BBC interview with AirSafeNews.com's Dr. Todd Curtis
28 December 2009
BBC Interview About Attempted Bombing of Northwest Flight 253
As the investigation into the unsuccessful bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 enters its early stages, there are already several security issues that are being discussed by the media, including short term security measures and issues with US government terrorist databases.
Listen to the interview (4:09)
Listen to the interview (4:09)
27 December 2009
What Are the Key Airline Security and Terrorists Databases?
With the recent arrest of a suspect in the failed bombing of Northwest flight 253, one of the questions asked was why was this person allowed to get on an airplane if his name was in one of the US databases of suspected terrorists? The short story is that the suspect would have been barred from boarding if he were on a very specific list called the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA's) No-fly list. He would have been subject to extra scrutiny, but not necessarily barred from boarding, if he were on the TSA's Selectee list.
The suspect was on a much larger list of people with terrorists ties, but being on that list doesn't lead to increased TSA scrutiny. What follows is a very brief description of these three databases, plus a fourth database, that are relevant to the recent bombing situation.
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)
This is the US government's central repository of information on international terrorist activities. The database includes people who commit terrorist activities, who plan such activities, or perform supporting activities such as fund raising providing safe houses. The suspect, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was added to this database last month, and there are about 500,000 unique individuals in the database, of which 95% are non-US citizens. For more details, you can view the fact sheet on this database.
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)
only individuals who are known or reasonably suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism. This database consolidates information that used to be located in several different US government agencies. It is more restrictive than the TIDE database, and contains about 400,000 names. The suspect in the bombing was not one of them. The FBI has a list of frequently asked questions about this database.
Selectee List
Maintained by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), this database contains the names of individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being permitted to board an aircraft. This list, which has about 14,000 people, is a subset of the TSDB.
No-fly List
As the name implies, this is a list of people who are not allowed to board an airliner. Like the Selectee List, this No-fly list is maintained by the TSA and is a subset of the TSDB. This list has fewer than 4,000 names.
So far, the US government has admitted that there was insufficient information available on the suspect to place him in any of the last three lists, including the no-fly list. Also, the suspect's US entry visa, which was granted in 2008 before he was placed on the TIDE list, was not restricted or revoked after being placed on that list.
The suspect was on a much larger list of people with terrorists ties, but being on that list doesn't lead to increased TSA scrutiny. What follows is a very brief description of these three databases, plus a fourth database, that are relevant to the recent bombing situation.
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)
This is the US government's central repository of information on international terrorist activities. The database includes people who commit terrorist activities, who plan such activities, or perform supporting activities such as fund raising providing safe houses. The suspect, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was added to this database last month, and there are about 500,000 unique individuals in the database, of which 95% are non-US citizens. For more details, you can view the fact sheet on this database.
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)
only individuals who are known or reasonably suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism. This database consolidates information that used to be located in several different US government agencies. It is more restrictive than the TIDE database, and contains about 400,000 names. The suspect in the bombing was not one of them. The FBI has a list of frequently asked questions about this database.
Selectee List
Maintained by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), this database contains the names of individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being permitted to board an aircraft. This list, which has about 14,000 people, is a subset of the TSDB.
No-fly List
As the name implies, this is a list of people who are not allowed to board an airliner. Like the Selectee List, this No-fly list is maintained by the TSA and is a subset of the TSDB. This list has fewer than 4,000 names.
So far, the US government has admitted that there was insufficient information available on the suspect to place him in any of the last three lists, including the no-fly list. Also, the suspect's US entry visa, which was granted in 2008 before he was placed on the TIDE list, was not restricted or revoked after being placed on that list.
25 December 2009
Unsuccessful Attempt to Detonate a Bomb on Northwest flight 253 near Detroit
A passenger on a Northwest Airlines A330-300(N820NW) apparently attempted to detonate an explosive device while the aircraft was approaching Detroit. Flight 253 was an international flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, and early reports are that a passenger, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (earlier reports had his name as Abdul Mudallad), a 23-year-old Nigerian national, allegedly had the device strapped to one of his legs, and that the device was triggered during descent (about 20 minutes before landing) and started a small fire. The flight, operated by Northwest Airlines using an Airbus 330-300 aircraft with 278 passengers and 11 crew members on board, landed safely, and the suspect, the only person injured, was transported to a local hospital for treatment of serious burns.
A passenger who was interviewed by CNN stated that the suspect was sitting in seat 19A, that he heard a popping sound, followed by a glow and the smell of smoke . Nearby passengers subdued the suspect. Another passenger in an interview published by the Wall Street Journal said that she was in seat 18B, and she heard a loud bang after the aircraft had lowered its landing gear. Reportedly, at first she thought the plane might have gotten a flat tire, but then she said saw a flame leap from the lap of a man sitting in the row behind her in the window seat, 19A. The suspect was subdued, and moved to another part of the aircraft for the rest of the flight.
Northwest flight 253 had departed Amsterdam at about 0845 local time Friday morning, and arrived at Detroit, MI at about noon local time. The flight crew had declared some kind of emergency before the landing. The Airbus A330 had 278 passengers on board. Early reports also indicate that the suspect started his journey on a KLM flight from Nigeria to Amsterdam, and had connected with flight 253 in Amsterdam.
The device was described by unidentified US officials as a mixture of powder and liquid. Other reports included details such as the suspect using a syringe to inject some kind of liquid into the device.
Rep. Peter King, a US congressman from New York State, claims that the suspect's name did not appear on any of the terrorist watch lists maintained by US authorities, but that his name did turn up in other terrorism-related databases maintained by intelligence officials. An unidentified US official also claims that the suspect told investigators that he was given the device by al Qaeda operatives in Yemen, where he was also given instructions on how to detonate it. An unidentified White House official claims that this event was “an attempted act of terrorism.”
According to this Trip Advisor seat map of a Northwest A330-300, seat 19A would be a window seat situated directly over the left wing.
The White House has reportedly ordered unspecified increased security procedures at airports around the country, though the Department of Homeland Security threat level for the air transportation system has not changed from it current level of 'High' (orange) to 'Severe' (red).Additional Information
Fatal US and Canadian bombing events
Other A330 crashes and significant events
Airline security suggestions from AirSafe.com
Top Ten AirSafe.com tips for high threat travel
A330 Photo: J.P. Karas; Seat Map: TripAdvisor.com
Why TSA Cannot Order Sites to Take Down Sensitive Manual - with Notes and Commentary
The following 17 December 2009 article by Steven Aftergood of Secrecy News features some highlights from a 16 December 2009 hearing of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security on the ongoing problems caused by an accidental release of very sensitive security information by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Based on these highlights, it would appear that several members of Congress do not understand the difficulty of getting web sites (including AirSafeNews.com partner AirSafe.com) to remove a sensitive TSA procedures manual form the Internet. Additional notes,links, and commentary were added by AirSafeNews.com
After a Transportation Security Administration manual containing “sensitive security information” was inadvertently disclosed on a government website (see earlier AirSafeNews.com article), it was reposted on several non-governmental websites where it remains freely available. Asked what TSA intends to do about that, Acting TSA Administrator Gale D. Rossides told Congress that her agency does not have the legal authority to compel members of the public to remove sensitive TSA documents from their websites, though she wished that they would do so.
“Do the current regulations provide you a mechanism to keep individuals from reposting this information on other web sites?” asked Rep. Charles W. Dent (R-PA), at a December 16 hearing of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security.
“No, sir, they do not,” Ms. Rossides replied. “We do not have any authority to ask non-government or non-DHS (Department of Homeland Security, which includes TSA) sites to take it down.”
“What action does TSA intend to take against those who are reposting this sensitive document that should not be in the public domain?” Rep. Dent persisted.
“Well, right now, there really isn’t any authoritative action we can take,” Ms. Rossides said. “Honestly, persons that have posted it, I would, you know, hope that out of their patriotic sense of duty to, you know, their fellow countrymen, they would take it down [1]. But honestly, I have no authority to direct them and order them to take it down.”
But Rep. Dent expressed his own indignation at the web sites that ignored the official control markings on the TSA manual. “To those who reposted this security information on the internet, you should share in the blame should security be breached as a result of this disclosure,” he said [2].
But the urgency of the need to restrict continued access to the leaked TSA manual seemed diminished by Ms. Rossides’ declared view that aviation security has not “been compromised or weakened because of this incident.” Furthermore, she said, that manual was now obsolete because “very significant changes” have been made to airline security policy since the manual was issued.
Ms. Rossides added that in order to prevent further inadvertent disclosures of the newest security measures, she was refusing to provide a hardcopy of the latest edition of the TSA security manual to Congress. “I just wanted to take the absolute measures to protect that information, and that’s why a hardcopy wouldn’t be presented,” she said [3].
Rep. Dent objected to this. “By refusing to give a document to this committee because of concern about a public disclosure, that’s implying that this subcommittee would disclose the document. And that’s what, I guess, troubles me the most.” He said he would press the issue.
Subcommittee chair Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) said she would introduce legislation to bar contractors from access to “sensitive security information,” since contractors apparently were at fault in the inadvertent disclosure of the security manual. “It’ll be my legislative initiative to insist that contract employees not be used to handle sensitive security information, period,” she said [4].
Rep. James Himes (D-CT) asked whether TSA was examining who had downloaded the security manual.
“I believe that is part of what [the TSA Inspector General] is looking at,” Ms. Rossides said. “We do know — our CIO shop has done an initial review of who did download it and has it on their website — non-government, non-DHS websites. We do know that.” [5]
Resources
Listen to a brief description of the TSA document controversy
Full TSA report
Redacted TSA report
TSA prohibited and restricted Items
TSA Statement from December 9, 2009
Original AirSafeNews.com article on this topic
Follow-up article on how to safely redact an electronic document
Visitor feedback on the TSA data release
NSA procedures for redacting a document
Microsoft advice for minimizing metadata in Word documents
Tools for removing hidden data from Government Computer News
Notes
[1] The creator of AirSafeNews.com and AirSafe.com, Dr. Todd Curtis believes that in this particular situation, that threat to public safety made by making the document freely available to the public is minimal, and the the higher patriotic duty is to make the public aware of the situation, including making the document available through AirSafeNews.com and AirSafe.com.
[2] Dr. Curtis has stated that this attitude is complete nonsense. Security was breached when TSA accidentally released the document, and by now any attempts to erase a document that is already widely available online would be at best futile.
[3] If you wish to have a hardcopy of either the redacted or unredacted version of the document, please visit 2009.airsafe.org, download the appropriate PDF file, and print out your own hard copy edition. There are no legal limitations to printing this document, which is in the public domain. Any security classifications on the document must be followed only by those who are legally required to do so, which would likely include any US government employee or members of the US military.
[4] Dr. Curtis hastens to point out that any contractors would have been overseen by US government employees. This member of Congress implies that contractors are not fit to handle sensitive security information, but a reasonable extension of this argument is that government employees are also not fit to handle such information.
[5] The TSA Inspector General is invited to contact AirSafeNews.com for a list of all those associated with publication of this web site who have downloaded this document. AirSafeNews.com will also willingly supply information on the number of downloads made from the server at AirSafe.com that contains this manual. As of 24 December 2009, that number is just under 7,000. Unfortunately, AirSafe.com's privacy policy prevents that site from tracking the destination of these downloads, so we can only provide the US government with general guidance on just how daunting any search for copies of this document will be.
After a Transportation Security Administration manual containing “sensitive security information” was inadvertently disclosed on a government website (see earlier AirSafeNews.com article), it was reposted on several non-governmental websites where it remains freely available. Asked what TSA intends to do about that, Acting TSA Administrator Gale D. Rossides told Congress that her agency does not have the legal authority to compel members of the public to remove sensitive TSA documents from their websites, though she wished that they would do so.
“Do the current regulations provide you a mechanism to keep individuals from reposting this information on other web sites?” asked Rep. Charles W. Dent (R-PA), at a December 16 hearing of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security.
“No, sir, they do not,” Ms. Rossides replied. “We do not have any authority to ask non-government or non-DHS (Department of Homeland Security, which includes TSA) sites to take it down.”
“What action does TSA intend to take against those who are reposting this sensitive document that should not be in the public domain?” Rep. Dent persisted.
“Well, right now, there really isn’t any authoritative action we can take,” Ms. Rossides said. “Honestly, persons that have posted it, I would, you know, hope that out of their patriotic sense of duty to, you know, their fellow countrymen, they would take it down [1]. But honestly, I have no authority to direct them and order them to take it down.”
But Rep. Dent expressed his own indignation at the web sites that ignored the official control markings on the TSA manual. “To those who reposted this security information on the internet, you should share in the blame should security be breached as a result of this disclosure,” he said [2].
But the urgency of the need to restrict continued access to the leaked TSA manual seemed diminished by Ms. Rossides’ declared view that aviation security has not “been compromised or weakened because of this incident.” Furthermore, she said, that manual was now obsolete because “very significant changes” have been made to airline security policy since the manual was issued.
Ms. Rossides added that in order to prevent further inadvertent disclosures of the newest security measures, she was refusing to provide a hardcopy of the latest edition of the TSA security manual to Congress. “I just wanted to take the absolute measures to protect that information, and that’s why a hardcopy wouldn’t be presented,” she said [3].
Rep. Dent objected to this. “By refusing to give a document to this committee because of concern about a public disclosure, that’s implying that this subcommittee would disclose the document. And that’s what, I guess, troubles me the most.” He said he would press the issue.
Subcommittee chair Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) said she would introduce legislation to bar contractors from access to “sensitive security information,” since contractors apparently were at fault in the inadvertent disclosure of the security manual. “It’ll be my legislative initiative to insist that contract employees not be used to handle sensitive security information, period,” she said [4].
Rep. James Himes (D-CT) asked whether TSA was examining who had downloaded the security manual.
“I believe that is part of what [the TSA Inspector General] is looking at,” Ms. Rossides said. “We do know — our CIO shop has done an initial review of who did download it and has it on their website — non-government, non-DHS websites. We do know that.” [5]
Resources
Listen to a brief description of the TSA document controversy
Full TSA report
Redacted TSA report
TSA prohibited and restricted Items
TSA Statement from December 9, 2009
Original AirSafeNews.com article on this topic
Follow-up article on how to safely redact an electronic document
Visitor feedback on the TSA data release
NSA procedures for redacting a document
Microsoft advice for minimizing metadata in Word documents
Tools for removing hidden data from Government Computer News
Notes
[1] The creator of AirSafeNews.com and AirSafe.com, Dr. Todd Curtis believes that in this particular situation, that threat to public safety made by making the document freely available to the public is minimal, and the the higher patriotic duty is to make the public aware of the situation, including making the document available through AirSafeNews.com and AirSafe.com.
[2] Dr. Curtis has stated that this attitude is complete nonsense. Security was breached when TSA accidentally released the document, and by now any attempts to erase a document that is already widely available online would be at best futile.
[3] If you wish to have a hardcopy of either the redacted or unredacted version of the document, please visit 2009.airsafe.org, download the appropriate PDF file, and print out your own hard copy edition. There are no legal limitations to printing this document, which is in the public domain. Any security classifications on the document must be followed only by those who are legally required to do so, which would likely include any US government employee or members of the US military.
[4] Dr. Curtis hastens to point out that any contractors would have been overseen by US government employees. This member of Congress implies that contractors are not fit to handle sensitive security information, but a reasonable extension of this argument is that government employees are also not fit to handle such information.
[5] The TSA Inspector General is invited to contact AirSafeNews.com for a list of all those associated with publication of this web site who have downloaded this document. AirSafeNews.com will also willingly supply information on the number of downloads made from the server at AirSafe.com that contains this manual. As of 24 December 2009, that number is just under 7,000. Unfortunately, AirSafe.com's privacy policy prevents that site from tracking the destination of these downloads, so we can only provide the US government with general guidance on just how daunting any search for copies of this document will be.
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