Three airliner crashes in one week is not that rare

The recent loss of three airliners within a seven day span, starting with Malaysia Airliners flight MH17 on July 17th, has certainly drawn a large amount of attention from the world's media, the traveling public, and even from major aviation safety organizations.

In a 28 July 2014 article published by CNN, a representative of the Flight Safety Foundation, a nonprofit organization that since 1947 has provided safety guidance and resources for the aerospace industry, implied that with the exception of the 9/11 attacks, it was hard to know whether the loss of three airliners in seven days was unprecedented. A review of the AirSafe.com records revealed that this kind of loss has had a number of precedents within the last 20 years.

In a previous AirSafeNews.com article, a review of AirSafe.com records from 1996 to 2014 revealed that there were 25 occasions where there were three or more significant aviation events where the events were separated by 10 days or fewer.

Inspired by the statement from the Flight Safety Foundation, Todd Curtis reviewed AirSafe.com's records again, this time discover how many times the there had been three or more losses of airliners in no more than a seven day period, and where the following criteria were also met:

• At least one passenger was killed in each aircraft,
• The aircraft was either destroyed or seriously damaged and no longer flyable,
• The aircraft had the capacity to carry at least 10 passengers, and
• The airliner event could have been due to any cause, including hijacking, sabotage, or military action.

The review revealed that there were eight occasions during the 19 calendar years that AirSafe.com has been in operation (1996-2014), where three or more airliners have been lost within a seven day period. Below are the years and the dates of occurrence:

1. 1997 - December 13, 15, 17, and 19
2. 2001 - September 11, 12, and 18
3. 2003 - January 8, 9, and 9
4. 2008 - August 20, 24, and 24
5. 2010 - May 12, 15, 17
6. 2010 - August 24, 24, and 25
7. 2011 - July 8, 11, and 13
8. 2014 - July 17, 23, and 24

Noteworthy occurrences include the following:

• In 1997, there were four separate events within seven days, and if an event on December 9th is included, five within 10 days.

• In 2001, there were four airliners lost on 9/11, and one each in the two subsequent events

• In 2010, if a fourth event on May 22 is included, there were four events in 10 days.

Given that the rate at which serious airline events occur has steadily decreased over the years, if this same analysis were done in the period prior to 1996, there would likely be a higher frequency of cases where three or more airliner were lost within a seven day span.

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Fatal and serious events by year
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000
2001, 2002,2003, 2004, 2005
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

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Related information
"Do plane crashes happen in threes" AirSafeNews.com article
Todd Curtis discusses his findings on the Rudy Maxa Show (6:44)
Related article from Patrick Smith of AskThePilot.com

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AirSafe.com Bonuses
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Also available is the AirSafe.com Fear of Flying Resource Guide, with an overview of the symptoms of fear of flying, as well as recommended resources for managing or eliminating these fears.

Why box cutters found on a jetBlue flight is not a cause for concern

The recent news about a pair of box cutters being found on a jetBlue flight may at first seem frightening, but it is probably not a cause for concern for the average passenger. Last Saturday, on February 26th, several box cutters fell from the carry on bag of a passenger on jetBlue flight 837 shortly before the aircraft was due to depart New York's JFK airport for a flight to the Dominican Republic.

A flight attendant who saw the box cutters fall out of the bag informed the captain. The passengers were evacuated, the aircraft searched, and the passengers rescreened before the aircraft was allowed to depart. The passenger who owned the box cutters, who was reportedly a factory worker from New Jersey, was interviewed by authorities and released without being charged.

Why box cutters are a big deal
According the the 9/11 Commission Report (see page 9), a passenger on American Airlines flight 77 (which was deliberately crashed into the Pentagon) reported that the hijackers were armed with box cutters. The Commission did not mention whether such weapons were used on the the other three hijacked flights. Although knives with blades less than four inches (about 10 cm) in length were allowed in the passenger cabin prior to 9/11, knives of any length have since joined a long list of items banned from the passenger cabin.

The TSA, which was formed after 9/11, has numerous procedures in place to prevent knives, box cutters, and other contraband from entering the secure area of the airport. No security procedure is perfect, and clearly in this case the procedures did not work. Ann Davis, a spokesperson for TSA, stated that three screeners will be disciplined and given remedial training for failing to spot the box cutters. She did not mention if TSA also considered changing any of their current procedures. If procedures are changed, it is unlikely that the public will be notified, unless of course TSA accidentally releases sensitive security information to the general public, as they did in late 2009, when they released for public review a report on security procedures without completely deleting the most sensitive security information.

Why box cutters are not a big deal
While box cutters can certainly be used as a weapon, and keeping them off airplanes is a good idea, the fact that some box cutters accidentally ended up on the jetBlue flight did not expose passengers to any danger because there was no plot by any individual or group to cause harm to the aircraft or its occupants. There are many other reasons why the presence of box cutters should not be of great concern to the flying public:

• Knives and other potential weapons are readily available in the airport terminal or allowed on board by TSA: While the TSA thoroughly screens any individual who wants to access the secure area of an airport terminal, there are many items that the TSA allows in the passenger cabin of aircraft or that are available in the terminal that could be used as weapons. Items which are currently allowed in the passenger cabin include matches, cigarette lighters, screwdrivers that are shorter than seven inches (18 cm) long, and sharp pointed scissors less than four inches (10 cm) long. Also, while passengers and flight crews may be prohibited from taking knives into the secure area of an airport terminal, the restaurants, bars, and other eating establishments in the secure area of an airport will likely have knives and many other potential weapons at hand.
  
  
• Additional layers of security added after 9/11: In addition to hardened cockpit doors, and updated flight crew and cabin crew procedures for preventing or dealing with attempted hijackings, some flight may also have armed federal air marshals or armed flight crew members.
  
  
• Passengers more likely to confront a hijacker: Prior to 9/11, hijackers may have had many motivations for taking control of an aircraft, including killing passengers or taking them as hostages, but with rare exceptions like the 1987 hijacking of a Pacific Southwest Airlines airliner, forcing the aircraft to crash was not a goal. In the pre-9/11 era, passengers and crews would comply with hijacker demands, rather than attempting to intervene. Since 9/11, passengers have consistently demonstrated a willingness to immediately confront hijackers, including Richard Ried (the Shoe Bomber), who attempted to set off an explosive on an American Airlines flight in December 2001, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the Underwear Bomber), who attempted to set off a bomb on a Northwest Airlines flight in December 2009.
  
  
• TSA security procedures are not designed to be 100% effective: As last year's public outcry over invasive TSA search procedures illustrated, the TSA has to balance the need to have a secure air transportation system with the need to have procedures that reduce risks from hijacking and sabotage, while at the same time not exposing air travelers to other kinds of unacceptable risks, including invasions of privacy and exposure to radiation from full-body scanners. In the recent jetBlue incident, the box cutters in the carry on bag were not spotted by either the screening devices used for carry on bags or by the TSA screeners who presumably should have searched the bag and found the box cutters. Even after additional training, there is no guarantee that those screeners, or any other airport screening professional, will be able to find every banned item.

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Bonus Video - Space Shuttle launch seen from airliner
Below is a video of Space Shuttle Discovery's final launch (STS-133) on 24 February 2011. This has no bearing on any airline safety or security issue, this is just plain fun to watch. Please enjoy.

Photo: Duke Green
Video: NeilMonday

Air Marshal Subdues Suspicious Passenger on Washington to Denver Flight

April 7, 2010, 10:16 pm EDT - Early news reports indicated that a Federal Air Marshal subdued a passenger on United flight 663 during a Washington (DCA) to Denver flight after a passenger reportedly behaved oddly and claimed to have attempted to ignite some kind of device. The 757, which was carrying 157 passengers and six crew members, landed at Denver at about 7 p.m. local time without further incident, and there were no reports of any injuries.

About half an hour before landing, a passenger had been in the lavatory for some period of time, and was approached by an air marshal because of a smell of smoke. The passenger allegedly told an air marshal that he was a Qatari diplomat, and when asked what he was doing remarked that he had been trying to set his shoes on fire. The diplomat was later identified by CNN as Mohammaed Al-Madadi. The US State Department's Diplomatic List for Qatar lists a Mohammed Yaaqob Y.M. Al Madadi with the title of Third Secretary. No official source has confirmed that this was the person taken into custody on the incident flight.

The flight crew was notified, and NORAD scrambled two USAF F-16s that intercepted the airliner at about 6:45 p.m. and escorted the plane to Denver. Officials took the passenger into custody and interviewed the other passengers on the flight. There were no explosives or other dangerous articles found.

The 27-year-old diplomat was not charged, and was later released and allowed to return to Washington, DC.

Message from the Qatari Ambassador
Within hours of the incident, the Qatari ambassador to the US, Ali bin Fahad Al-Hajri, made the following statement:

Press reports today regarding an incident aboard a commercial flight from Washington, DC to Denver, CO indicate that a Qatari diplomat was detained for suspicious behavior.  We respect the necessity of special security precautions involving air travel, but this diplomat was traveling to Denver on official embassy business on my instructions, and he was certainly not engaged in any threatening activity.  the facts will reveal that this was a mistake, and we urge all concerned parties to avoid reckless judgments or speculation.

For a detailed timeline of this flight, check out this Atlantic magazine article.

Another Perspective on the Risk of Airline Bombings

Since 2001, terror events, including attempted bombings, have been a serious concern for passengers and governments around the world. While high profile terror events of all kinds have been a concern, the probability of a bombing event involving a US airliner or a flight departing or arriving from the US hasn't seen any major changes since 1960.

Terror Events in the Previous Decade
Nate Silver, better know as the person behind the political polling site FiveThirtyEight.com, ran an article that used data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) to evaluate the risk of a terrorist attack on airliners that either departed from the US or had a US destination.

Looking over the ten year period from 2000-2009, Silver identified six attempted terror-related events on board these airline flights, including the four planes hijacked on 9/11, the December 2001 attempted bombing of an American Airlines 767 by convicted shoe bomber Richard Reid, and the January 2009 attempted bombing of a Northwest Airlines A330 by alleged underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

Odds of Being a Terror Victim
Silver reviewed BTS records and estimated that there were 99.3 million commercial airline departures that either originated or landed within the United States, or one terrorist incident per 16.6 million departures.

He further estimated that excluding crew members, bombers and hijackers, there were 674 passengers on those six flights on which these incidents occurred, compared with seven million estimated passenger enplanements during that decade, giving the probability of being on a given departure which is the subject of a terrorist incident of about 1 in 10.4 million. He contrasts this risk with the 1 in 500,000 chance of being struck by lightning.

Odds of Being a Bombing Victim
If you only look at the bombing events in there previous decade, there were two, including last month's attempt on Northwest Airlines and the 2001 show bombing event. Using Nate Silver's numbers, the rate of bombing events on US airliners from 2000 to 2009 was 1 in 31.2 million departures.

Previous US Bombing Events
Nate Sliver only looked at events during the previous decade. AirSafe.com has tracked US bombing attempts going back to the 1950s, and found that in the four decades from 1960 to 1999, there were eight events on US airliners that involved a bombing attempt or a successful bombing, with seven involving passenger fatalities. This averaged two per decade, compared with the six in the decades of the 1990s. However, the average number of flights was lower during this 40-year period. According to BTS data, there were about 311.6 million flights during this four decade period, which means the rate of bombing attempts from 1960-1999 was 1 per 39 million flights, compared to 1 per 31.2 million flights for 2000-2009.

How These Two Periods Compare
One of the things that stand out with the events from 1960-1999 was that only six of the bombing events involved a deliberate attempt by individuals or groups that could be associated with terrorism. If only those six are counted, then the rate for the 1960-1999 period drops to 1 in 59.1 million flights, roughly half the risk of the 2000-2009 period.

Does this mean that the risk of bomb related terrorism has doubled in the previous decade? Maybe. However, if the alleged underwear bomber had waited another week and attempted a bombing on January 1st, the 2000-2009 rate would have been 1 in 64.4 million flights, even less than the terror-related bombing rate for 1960-1999.

Reflections on Aviation Security Eight Years after 9/11

Since the 9/11 attacks eight years ago, every anniversary brings an increase in interest by the media and by the general public. Last month, Dr. Todd Curtis of AirSafe.com was interviewed by a researcher from Lancaster University in the UK about security post 9/11. Below are some of the questions and their responses. We would be interested in what you think about both the questions and answers, and welcome your feedback.

1. Would you say 9/11 changed our perception of aviation safety? That now the prevalence of terrorism has made many people think they have more chance of being involved in an air disaster than being killed in a car crash?

The biggest change is that security concerns became very prominent. At the governmental level, both before and after 9/11, airline security and airline issues were dealt with by different philosophies. Safety and reliability issues were usually dealt with through a regulatory and administrative process that was deliberate, open, and sometimes stretching over a series of months or years. Multiple points of view were often encouraged, and given the opportunity to become part of the debate. In contrast, security issues were often political in nature,
where quick and decisive action was demanded by governments and by the industry. As a result, many things were done quickly, but often without an open and objective process guiding policy.

As for the public's perception of risks in the air compared to more common risks like cars, there had been very clear differences in the public's opinion and the media's coverage well before 9/11. One example was a study I conducted on media coverage by the New York Times during a 17-year, pre-9/11 period of 1978 to 1994. Among other things, I found that fatal airline events that involved jet aircraft that were hijacked, sabotaged, or destroyed by military action, which represented about 8% of the fatal airline accidents reported by the Times during that period, accounted for about 48% of all the airline accident articles in that period. I have not looked at the post 9/11 era, but I suspect that if the same study were conducted for the years 1995-2009, the percentage would be even more skewed.

2. Would you say the creation of the TSA and the federalising of airport safety has made us safer or is it an illusion?

I would say that it has made part of the security process more consistent, and has given the government the ability to implement changes more quickly. On the other hand, some parts of the security process appear to remain in place because of habit or appearances rather than because of effectiveness. One example is the policy of screening shoes. The reason is because one person tried, luckily without success, to explode a bomb hidden within a shoe. While it makes sense to be concerned about a future event, it doesn't make sense to focus on shoes (every size shoe, even the thinnest sandal) while ignoring dozens of other devices that could hide as much or even more explosive than the average shoe. Anyone intending to do harm with a similarly sized explosive would simply use a device that is not closely screened.

3. Do you think in the post 9/11 climate there is a dilemma between preventing another attack vs. allowing passengers to travel freely?

I don't think so. Even before 9/11, security procedures used by organizations from airport screeners to national intelligence agencies worked to identify, deter, and prevent hijackings, bombings, and other acts of deliberate mayhem. That dilemma, or more precisely the need to balance security and freedom of movement, existed before and after 9/11. The difference is that in the current environment, the threats are considered to be much more organized and potentially much more lethal than in the past. The ongoing debate is whether the measures that are being taken now are too much, too little, or just right.

Unfortunately, it is hard to say if most of the measures that have been taken have been effective. Because of the nature of the threat, the general public will have little or no insight into the threats that did not lead to a bad outcome. In contrast, there are plenty of ways to measure how effective current and proposed safety measures are. When accidents happen, they are thoroughly investigated and the
results published for the entire world to see, and information from the thousands of incidents that don't result in accidents are available for study and analysis. Unlike the open databases of the NTSB, FAA, and AAIB, the files of the FBI, CIA, NSA, MI6, and GCHQ are closed to the public.

4. Would you say that the Lockerbie disaster that saw the release of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi on the 20th August and the September 11th attacks in 2001 illustrates the changing nature of aviation terrorism? That the Al Qaeda use of aeroplanes as controlled weapons, in the hands of terrorists makes dealing with the threat of terrorism harder?

I believe it does for several reasons. The biggest is that a nation can't afford to be seen as backing a large terror event such as 9/11. The consequences to Afghanistan's government for harboring Al Qaeda was that it was attacked and driven from power. Any country that attacks the US or a US ally could also expect a response that is swift, certain, and severe.

Al Qaeda used relatively few resources to carry out their attacks. They were apparently not funded by a government, but were certainly harbored by one. There are many organizations, including corporations, that also have the resources to carry out even more devastating attacks without the direct involvement of a government. In my opinion, any group intending to do similar harm in the future will likely learn from Al Qaeda and not associate with any particular leader, government, or physical location. By being a group that is not associated with a particular nation, it would make it much more difficult for the victimized nation to deal with the attack through traditional means such as economic sanctions backed by fleets of B-52s and Predators.

On the subject of aircraft as controlled weapons, Al Qaeda was not the first entity to successfully crash a plane into a Washington, DC area building. Seven years before the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, the White House was struck by a small Cessna, but the aircraft only minor damage and no injuries. Coincidentally, the aircraft took off on 9/11/1994. Like on 9/11 seven years later, the aircraft was also tracked on radar before the crash. This 1994 event was not due to a politically motivated hijacker, but due to a disturbed individual.

AirSafe.com would welcome any comments you may have about this article.
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